Skip to content

Arc Skills / Standards and development assurance

Review development assurance level allocation rationale

This task reviews whether development-assurance allocations follow the approved safety basis and stated architecture. Arc Skills returns an allocation trace with separate function, item, software and hardware decisions and unresolved rationale.

Use this skill

Use Arc Skills to review development-assurance allocations for the named aircraft or system baseline. Follow each failure condition into functions, implementing items and software or hardware.

Inputs:
- Approved safety assessment and failure-condition definitions.
- Function/item architecture and allocation record.
- Independence, monitor and common-cause evidence; authority agreements.

Return a trace table with FDAL, IDAL, software level and hardware DAL only where actually assigned, plus rationale and open decisions. Do not derive a letter from severity or substitute an AI allocation for an approved one.

Set up the toolkit · Read the skill instructions

What you provide and what you get

Inputs and outputs
What you haveHow it is usedWhat you get
Approved safety basisDefines failure conditions and function decisionsSource trace
Function/item architectureShows shared implementation and monitor pathAllocation chain
Independence evidenceTests any claimed reduction or decompositionUnsupported rationale

A monitored pair needs evidence for the claimed reduction

Illustrative engineering example.

A synthetic flight-control function FC-1 has an approved function allocation recorded as FDAL A. Items I-1 and I-2 implement a monitored pair. The allocation sheet proposes a reduced item level for I-1 because I-2 monitors it, but the monitor’s independence and effectiveness records are absent.

Allocation trace excerpt
ScopeRecorded assignmentRationale suppliedReview question
FC-1 functionFDAL A in approved safety assessmentSevere failure condition FC-F1Retain approved function assignment
I-1 implementing itemProposed reduced IDAL; not approvedI-2 detects erroneous I-1 outputProvide monitor coverage and independence analysis
I-2 monitor and its SW/HWItem/software/hardware levels not establishedShared supply and interface shownAssign through approved process; assess common cause

FDAL A is an illustrative recorded project assignment, not a severity-to-letter rule. The row for I-1 is only a proposal. The same monitor that motivates reduced assurance could fail silently or share a resource with the primary path, so its effectiveness and independence matter to the allocation argument.

The review does not automatically raise or lower any level. It identifies the missing evidence and leaves the item, software and hardware assignments to the controlled allocation process and authority. Shared supplies, multiple-function items and design changes must be reflected in the trace before the rationale can be judged.

Keep each assurance assignment in its own scope

  1. Trace failure condition to function and the approved function allocation.
  2. Trace function to every implementing and monitoring item, including shared resources.
  3. Inspect independence/decomposition credit and evidence at the failure-condition boundary.
  4. Record approved versus proposed IDAL, software level and hardware DAL separately.

Questions about this task

Does FDAL A make every item Level A?

No automatic inheritance follows from the label alone. Item allocation requires the applicable development-assurance process and architecture rationale.

Can a monitor justify reduced assurance?

Potentially, but only with an approved argument and evidence for detection, independence, common causes and integration.

Sources and further reading

  • FAA AC 20-174: Official recognition of ARP4754A as an acceptable civil-aircraft development process.
  • FAA AC 20-115D: Official guidance on airborne software assurance using DO-178C and applicable supplements.
  • FAA AC 20-152A: Official guidance on airborne electronic hardware development assurance.

FAA AC 20-174 recognizes ARP4754A for aircraft/system development; controlled project documents govern detailed allocations and authority decisions.